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Voluntary Public Unemployment Insurance  







Voluntary public unemployment systems are limited to a handful of countries, including 
Finland, Sweden, and, more substantially, Denmark.  A voluntary system has the positive 
feature of other user-cost schemes, potentially efficient targeting of services.  This presumes 
rational behavior as well as reasonable risk rating of premiums and the absence of worker 
access to alternative social programs.  Using a 10% sample of the Danish population drawn 
from administrative data, we exploit the voluntary Danish system to explore the structure of 
unemployment insurance demand.  The insurance take-up rate is surprisingly high, 80 
percent in 1995, but varies systematically with economic incentives in a way that raises 
doubts about the targeting value of the current system.  Political support for the Danish 
system may derive instead from the fact that a universal, compulsory system would generate 
rather modest additional net funds and with a twist--additional r evenue would come 
disproportionately from low-wage workers. 
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I.  Introduction 
Voluntary public unemployment systems are now uncommon, but were widespread in 
the early years of public unemployment insurance programs, ILO (1955).  Many European 
countries first intervened in unemployment insurance markets by subsidizing existing trade 
union programs, both for the obvious administrative convenience and perhaps to encourage 
the  growth of trade unions, Neumann, Pedersen, and Westergård-Nielsen (1991) and 
Western (1997).  Over time the bulk of these countries converted to compulsory systems, 
leaving only a handful of countries with voluntary systems, including Finland, Sweden, and 
more substantially Denmark.
1  The ubiquity of subsidized, voluntary public unemployment 
insurance systems early in the 1900s and their persistence in the Nordic countries raise the 
possibility that such systems may in fact be efficient under some circumstances.
 2 
A voluntary system has, of course, the positive feature of user cost schemes, 
potentially efficient targeting of use.  Governments typically impose compulsory system 
universally, at least within the range of the administratively feasible, but almost surely this is 
inefficient.
3  Whether because of temperament, asset position, or family situation, workers 
may simply not value earnings insurance.
4  The special value of self-selection is, however, a 
function of (i) the rationality of consumers, (ii) the accuracy of individual risk assessment in 
premium setting, and (iii) the absence of “free-riding” on other social insurance programs.  
Clearly understanding selection into the program is critical to assessing the value of a 
                                                 
1  Private premiums in the Finnish and Swedish systems are quite modest, essentially covering 
administrative costs.  Sweden adopted a compulsory system during the early 1990s, but the decision 
was reversed a year later. 
2  The U.S. unemployment insurance system was established later as a compulsory, if not quite 
universal, federal/state program.  See Baicker, Goldin, and Katz (1998) for a fine introduction to the U.S. 
system and the logic of its origins. 
3  Lower bounds on firm size in compulsory systems have been common in the U.S. unemployment 
system only firms with eight or more employees were compelled to join, Baicker, Goldin, and Katz 
(1998).  Firm size limits on government compulsion no doubt reflect both the higher administrative costs 
of mandated programs in small firms and the administrative costs of enforcing the mandate.   
4  Compulsion, properly targeted, permits governments to price their product without concern that they 
are distorting product purchase or consumption.  It is for this reason that Barr (1988) rejects 
Beenstock’s attempt to design an appropriate pricing scheme for unemployment insurance, Beenstock 
(1986).  The issue of proper targeting remains.     2 
voluntary system, because none of these can be comfortably assumed.  Using a 10% 
sample of the Danish population drawn primarily from administrative data, we explore these 
issues empirically, estimating the worker’s demand for unemployment insurance. 
The U.S. flood insurance program provides an illustration of the difficulties faced by 
voluntary public insurance systems.
5  After-the-event pressures to provide aid to flood victims 
induced the federal government to consider the failure of the private market for flood 
insurance.  Two arguments were especially compelling; that (i) hydrological data were not 
available to permit proper risk assessment of a structure, and (ii) consumers would not 
purchase the insurance at full price if flood insurance was available, presumably because of 
myopia and free rider strategies on other programs.
6  As a consequence, the federal 
government established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968, offering 
communities substantial incentives, including a program of heavily subsidized flood 
insurance on existing housing, to undertake appropriate flood risk surveys and land 
management reforms.  The insurance program demonstrated, however, that U.S. 
consumers would not voluntarily buy even heavily subsidized flood insurance: 
… there is evidence which suggests that many individuals will not purchase flood 
insurance voluntarily even if it is subsidized 90 percent by the federal government..  It 
appears unlikely that prospective homeowners would purchase flood insurance at 
actuarial rates unless they required to do so, particularly in view of the incentive to rely 
on disaster relief.  Howard Kunreuther (1973, p.23) 
 
Browne and Hoyt (2000, p.293) report that, “In 1993 the greatest single flood event in the 
United States occurred…Of the $12 billion in damages, less than $1 billion was covered by 
federal flood insurance.”
7 
                                                 
5  Anderson (1974) provides an early policy review. 
6 “Some years ago several companies seriously attempted to write specific flood insurance only to learn 
that there was a  very limited market for such coverage, that the peak demand for flood insurance was 
immediately following a flood, and that property owners generally did not maintain their flood insurance in 
force after the lapse of several floodless years.  These companies also learned that with adverse 
selection and their inability to get a proper spread of risk they were obliged to charge rates proportionate 
to the exposure which affected property owners could not or would not pay, American Insurance 
Association (1955, pp. 172-173). 
7 In response to the limited demand for insurance, the government turned to compulsion, requiring that 
all structures financed by an institution with a federal government link, which includes most mortgage   3 
This experience echoes that of early unemployment insurance programs.  William 
Franklin Willoughby for the U.S. Department of Labor reviewed early European programs for 
possible adoption in the United States.  One program he described was a voluntary program 
established in 1893 in Berne, Switzerland that was financed by a combination of membership 
dues, employer gifts and municipality contributions.  In the first full year of operation, payouts 
exceeded member dues by a factor of seven to one, yet in the second year paid membership 
shrank, and the plan quickly failed.  Recent experience in the United Kingdom with voluntary, 
heavily subsidized private unemployment insurance of home mortgages suggests that 
voluntary unemployment insurance remains difficult to sell to workers, Pryce and Keoghan 
(2001) and Keoghan and Pryce (2001).
8  The take-up rate is low, although modestly related 
to the premium charge and more substantially to unemployment probability—“a 10 per cent 
rise in the probability resulting in a 3 per cent increase in take-up,” Pryce and Keoghan (2001, 
p.179).
9 
The Danish system may not suffer from the same myopia concerns--the population is 
well educated and professionally counseled on government programs—but other problems 
may remain.  Governments rarely follow the missing markets model literally; premium setting 
is often loosely tied to individual risk, and Denmark’s system is no exception.  Premiums are 
the same for all workers, independent of unemployment risk, and the system is heavily 
subsidized out of general revenues.  This reduces concerns about myopia or optimism bias, 
but at the same time compromises arguments that a voluntary system improves recipient 
targeting.  Charity hazard is also a problem; the social safety net for unemployed workers 
without insurance coverage is generous.   
                                                                                                                                                        
suppliers in the U.S., must require that the mortgagors purchase Federal insurance.  This mandate has 
had surprisingly modest effects, perhaps because of limited efforts to enforce the mandate, GAO (1990).   
8  One unanswered question in their research was the extent of screening of bad risks by insurance 
sellers. 
9 A related literature on the take-up rate of benefits among unemployment insurance eligibles is also 
relevant.  A long term decline in UI benefit take-up rates has stimulated considerable policy interest, e.g. 
Corson and Nicholson  (1988) and Blank and Card (1991) in the United States and Storer and Van   4 
In the next section we describe in detail the Danish unemployment insurance system, 
which is organized around unemployment insurance funds (“A-kasser” or U-funds).  We then 
introduce in Section III a formal model of the worker’s decision to join an unemployment fund; 
the decision requires consideration of the worker’s unemployment risk, the program’s 
premium and expected benefits, and alternative income support programs for the uninsured 
unemployed.  We describe in Section IV the principal data set used in this study, a 10 percent 
sample of the Danish population, drawn from IDA (“Integret Database for 
Arbeitsmarkedsforskning” or integrated data base for labor market research) and the tax 
registry.  We then present evidence of the sensitivity of the U-fund membership decision to 
economic incentives, first in the aggregate data (Section V) and then in the microdata, using 
a multivariate logit analysis of fund membership (Section VI).  Because of concerns about 
unobserved heterogeneity, we report on efforts to estimate a conditional logit model of the 
fund membership decision in Section VII.
10  All models appear to tell a consistent story-- the 
U-fund take-up rate is surprisingly high, but workers are sensitive to the usual economic 
calculus; low unemployment risk workers and those with access to means-tested 
alternatives are least likely to join.  In Section VIII we consider the redistributive issue, which 
may hold the key to the political popularity of the voluntary system in Denmark; we estimate 
the net revenue consequences of making the system universal and compulsory across 
demographic and economic groups.  In Section IX we briefly discuss a few policy 
implications of our findings. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Audenrode (1995) in Canada.  McCall (1995) and Anderson and Meyer (1997) stress the sensitivity of UI 
take-up to replacement rates. 
10  Because of certain data limitations that we discuss at length in Section VII, we are unable to 
estimate crucial first differences for some covariates.   5 
II.  The Danish Voluntary Unemployment Insurance System 
The Danish unemployment system is organized around member-controlled, private 
unemployment funds (U-funds).
11  Historically, the first state-recognized funds were union 
funds, formally independent of the union organization.  In theory it was possible to join the 
fund without joining the respective union; although in practice this was hard and sometimes 
impossible.  In the 1980s, the linkage between union membership and U-fund membership 
was broken in practice as well as theory.
12  There were 37 state-recognized funds in 1994-5, 
in principle one fund for each trade, two funds for the self-employed and a general fund for 
both employers and employees (a Christian U-fund).
13 
  All funds are tightly regulated by the government and face identical rules on fund 
membership procedures, including base membership fees, search and other eligibility 
requirements, and benefit levels and duration, although plans can and do differ in related 
services, including search counseling services, which are linked with fee differentials.
14  After 
January 1, 1994, the following individuals
15 could join the fund linked to their occupation or 
education (or the Christian U-fund): (1) employees; (2) the self employed; (3) working/helping 
spouses to the self employed; (4) individuals with occupational or further education of 18 
month or more; and (5) individuals serving their military duty. 
  The basic annual membership fee is set administratively at eight times the maximum 
daily UI benefit.  In 1995 the fee was 3660 DKK ($654) for employees and 4071 DKK ($727) 
                                                 
11 For a careful discussion of the Swedish unemployment insurance system, see Bjorklund and 
Holmlund (1991).  A broad overview of recent trends in unemployment and labor market policies in 
Denmark can be found in Westergaard-Nielsen (2001). 
12   In 1988 it was made an explicit precondition for state recognition and hence government subsidy that 
the U -funds not condition U -fund membership on trade union membership. (Direktoratet for 
Arbejdsløshedsforsikring, 1988). 
13  There is a minimum size limit on funds, so that smaller unions must arrange to join funds operated by 
larger unions. 
14  Note that there is no longer an implicit risk adjustment.  The linkage between premiums and payouts, 
a crucial part of the early subsidy schemes, has been lost with the high public involvement in both 
financing and controlling the scheme. 
15  Provided they were between 16-65 years of age and residents of Denmark.   6 
for the self-employed.
16  This pricing scheme makes the government's share of U -fund 
expenditures dependent on the business cycle and implies that the funds are self-supporting 
when the average unemployment is approximately 3%, ignoring fund-related leave schemes 
and the early retirement supplement (“efterløn”).  Between 1975 and 1995 the average 
unemployment rate in Denmark was roughly 9%, so member fees covered only one third of 
direct fund benefit outlays, with the remainder covered by state subsidies and by compulsory 
contributions from employers.  In 2001 when unemployment was close to 5%, fees covered 
almost 75% of the direct unemployment benefit outlays and 1/3 of total expenditures.  
  To be eligible for benefits in case of unemployment, the typical worker must pay into the 
U-fund for one year and have worked for at least twenty-six weeks during the three years 
preceding the date of unemployment.  If one joined a U-fund under (4) or (5) above, one can 
get UI benefits without ever having had paid work.  For full benefits, one must be involuntarily 
released; workers who voluntarily quit forfeit the first five weeks of benefits. 
  Benefits were 90% of the unemployed w orker's prior earnings up to a relatively low 
ceiling, 135,536 DKK ($24,203) per year in 1994, and 136,709 DKK ($24,412) per year in 
1995.  Benefit duration is extraordinary by U.S. standards.  In the period from which our data 
were drawn, 1994 and 1995, a  covered, unemployed worker was eligible for benefits for 
seven years, but subject to workfare after four. The seven years could be extended for up to 
two more years by taking specific training options (“education leave”).
17  
Long-term membership in a U-fund also provides substantial early retirement benefits 
through efterløn.  Efterløn pays early retirement benefits beginning at age 60 equivalent to the 
worker’s U -fund benefit for the first 2 1/2 years, after which it pays 82% of the maximum U-
fund benefit as a flat rate until the member turns 67, the "normal" retirement age for the 
pension system.  Eligibility requirements are substantial;  you must have been a U -fund 
                                                 
16  At that time, recently self employed individuals paid a higher fee, 9 times the maximum daily UF-
benefits.  The self-employment differential was eliminated in 1996.  Part-time workers, those who work 
less than 31 hours per week, have both the fee and benefits reduced by one-third.  
17  By 1999, benefit duration was at most 4 years, with workfare after one year.   7 
member for 20 out of the last 25 years at the time you wish to start receiving  efterløn 
benefits.
18  For someone wishing to retire at 60 that means joining the U-fund no later than 
age 40.  Efterløn is extremely popular and few fund members do not expect to receive some 
payments; among U-fund members between the ages of 60 and 66, approximately 2/3 were 
on efterløn in 1995. 
The long association of U-fund and union membership raises some question of the 
worker’s degree of choice in joining a fund or not.  It remains legal for a union to require that 
members belong to its unemployment insurance fund, although this practice, once common, 
is now quite rare.  Union membership is itself a voluntary decision in Denmark, and unions 
seem disinclined to impose ancillary requirements on members that might discourage 
workers from joining the union.  Inquiries with unions and experts on unions uncovered only 
one national union with a compulsory U-fund, the journalists union, apparently as a way of 
expressing solidarity with other workers.  U-fund membership requirements at the local union 
level are apparently also rare. 
Social pressure to join a fund is also possible, but difficult to document directly.  Such 
pressures are most plausible in manual skill unions, Steen Scheur (personal communication, 
April 14, 2001).  A representative of the largest Danish union, HK, representing white collar 
workers, reports that formal bylaws compelling fund membership may be found in “some 
sections of SID”, the largest union of unskilled workers, and were previously common among 
skilled workers in the building trades (Machael Valentin, writing on behalf of John Dahl, Head, 
personal communication with Niels Blomgren-Hansen, April 6, 2001).  However, Lars 
Brejnrod of the Economics Department of SID reports that, although “only a few thousands 
out of about 300,000 union members are not members of the associated unemployment 
fund,” it is not compulsory, at least at the national levels.  He attributes the high take-up rate 
among SID members to economic interest rather than social pressure or norms, especially 
                                                 
18  If one becomes a U -fund member at the age of 43, for instance, one can get efterløn-benefits only 
between ages 63 and 66.   8 
with the addition of efterløn.  He also raises an issue that will arise again below, “It is true that 
public relief may be approximately as high as the unemployment benefit.  However you can 
only get relief if you are “in need”, that means that you don’t have means yourself and your 
spouse does not earn enough to support you.” (personal communication with Niels 
Blomgren-Hansen, April 17, 2002).  The ratio of fund membership to union members appears 
to bear out the relative popularity of unemployment funds in low skill unions.  Among the five 
largest unions, the ratio is approximately 100% in SID and KAD (unskilled women), 94% in 
FOA (public employees), 87% in HK (white collar) and 83% in Metal (skilled, metal 
industry).
19  In the sensitivity analysis section below, we will partition our primary logit model 
by industry and occupation to explore behavioral differences that might be attributable to 
union social pressure. 
IV.  A Model of The Decision to Join an Unemployment Fund 
Ignoring for the moment any fixed costs of entry into the unemployment fund, the 
membership decision of an economically rational worker reduces to a series of single period 
optimization decisions.  Consider then a rational, risk averse worker, who places no special 
weight on the source of her income; that is, she is neither myopic nor sensitive to welfare 
stigma.  The insurance decision is a dichotomous one, join the fund or not, because the 
individual has no choice of extent of coverage, the parameters of which are set by the 
government. 
The i
th worker is assumed to have earnings ei when employed and additional private 
income Ai (capital income, spouse’s earnings, etc.).  The worker must pay a fee fi in order to 
become a member of the U -fund, and will receive a benefit payment  Bi if she becomes 
unemployed, which occurs with probability  qI.  The benefit parameter would include any 
increments to early retirement benefits that result from U -fund membership.  Finally, if the 
unemployed worker does not belong to a U-fund, she may be eligible for means-tested social 
                                                 
19  These statistics are from Danmarks Statistik (1999).  Note that these figures may be somewhat 
misleading because some smaller unions do not have funds of their own, but instead join bigger ones.    9 
assistance.  To a first approximation, these programs are substitutes and an opportunity cost 
of joining an unemployment insurance fund is the loss of social assistance payments.  
Denote these means-tested social assistance benefits by S(g, Ai), where g is a positive shift 
parameter.  S is presumably a non-negative function of other family income Ai, so that S1 > 0 
and S2 £ 0. 
It is easily demonstrated that, with an additively separable utility function in 
consumption and leisure and a dichotomous (zero-one) work choice, the expected value 
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where D =  } 0 | ) ( { } 1 | ) ( { = - = UF U E UF U E i i , the i
th worker’s net gain in expected utility of 
joining the U-fund.  Not surprisingly the attractiveness of U-fund membership is increasing in 
unemployment risk and U-fund-benefits and decreasing in both the fee, and the generosity of 
social assistance benefits, indexed by ?.  The prior earnings effect is positive because the 
marginal utility cost of paying the fixed membership fee is decreasing in income, while the 
asset effect is ambiguous without stronger assumptions on the curvature of the utility 
function  
One Dynamic Consideration.  The Danish U -fund has an investment element that 
make the decision a multiperiod one; it is necessary to pay into the system for one year (and 
work for at least 26 weeks in most circumstances) before qualifying for unemployment 
benefits.  As a consequence, a short run reduction in membership returns, even a large one, 
will not necessarily cause a worker to leave the fund, because the worker must purchase a 
year’s membership to become eligible again.   
To illustrate the impact of the one-year waiting period on the U-fund decision, consider 
a risk-neutral worker.  In the model above, the worker in period t would join a U-fund if and 
                                                                                                                                                        
We are indebted to Niels Blomgren-Hansen for the statistics and the caveat.   10 
only if the expected value of fund benefits in that period exceeds social assistance payments 
by more than the fund fee: 
0 ) ( ‡ - - t t t t f S B q . 
If however the unemployment probability increases monotonically with age ( 0 ‡ ¢ q ) while all 
other factors {B, S, f} remain constant, the risk neutral worker will join the fund in the first time 
period in which: 
0 ) ( 1 ‡ - - + f S B
c t q , and  0 ] ) ( [
1








c f f S B q d ,  
where  T denotes the length of the work life and tc the year of first payment into the fund 
(entry).  The net return must be nonnegative in the first protection year and the discounted 
annual net returns to fund membership must equal or exceed the membership fee--the one 
year fee payment.  Conversely consider the case in which the unemployment probability 
decreases monotonically with age ( 0 £ ¢ q ).  In this case it is transparent that the worker, if 
she ever joins the fund, will do so in the first period.  The decision rule for the risk-neutral 
worker is to join in the first period if and only if: 
0 ] ) ( [
2







t f f S B . 
where t is the date of exit from the system (the last period in the system).  Exit will occur in 
the first period in which the single period condition holds.  A fortiori, the discounted value of all 
future expected net returns is negative at this point, although it may be negative at an earlier 
stage as well.  The entry and exit algorithms become more complex if, as appears to be the 
case, net returns to membership vary nonmonotonically over the work life. 
V.  The Data 
Our primary data set is extracted from IDA (An Integrated Data Base for Labor Market 
Research) and the Income Tax Register, which are maintained by Danish Statistics, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 This preference s tructure implies equal consumption across states if insurance is complete and 
costless.   11 
government statistical office.
21  Administrative data from a variety of government sources 
were compiled for a ten percent sample of the Danish population between the age of 18 and 
66 in 1995.
22  The value of using an administrative data set to examine unemployment fund 
membership is clear; an exact record of the individual’s insurance status (U-fund 
membership) is provided.  The involvement of the government in many facets of Danish life 
means that the data set contains much more demographic and economic data than would be 
available in U.S. administrative data.  Not only do the data contain records of U -fund 
membership and benefit receipt and social assistance receipt, they contain the usual 
demographics--sex, age, marital status; presence of children in the household, educational 
attainment—as well as labor force activity; earnings, income and wealth. 
The key unemployment variable, unemployed all of week 48, the fourth week in 
November, is not the usual survey response, but is an administrative construct and may 
undercount laid off workers who do not contact public services because they believe they do 
not qualify for unemployment or social assistance benefits or other related services.  Survey 
evidence of the extent of unreported unemployment is available, and suggests the numbers 
are relatively small: in 1995 approximately 13,000 individuals (0.45 percent of the labor force) 
were looking for work, but did not receive unemployment compensation nor were registered 
at the employment office (“AF-kontor”) according to Denmarks Statistiks Labor Force 
Survey.
23  Conversely the unemployment category includes many individuals who are not 
unemployed in the usual sense of being available for work if offered.
24 
                                                 
21  The data is available for a fee that is substantial by U.S. government standards.  The fee is expected 
to cover the cost of compiling and maintaining the data set as well as the marginal cost of providing it to 
the user.  For commercial and privacy reasons the data can only be accessed at sites authorized by 
Danish Statistics. 
22  Although the focus of the analysis is calendar year 1995, to accommodate lagged variables and 
analyses of behavioral change, the sample was drawn in 1993 and sample members then followed for 
two years. 
23  This information was provided by Danmarks Statistiks to the Ministery of Finance, Denmark (Personal 
Communication with Tranæs, 2002).   
24 Pedersen and Smith (1995) find that only some 60% of the individuals receiving unemployment 
compensation wanted a job  and were actively searching for one. Denmark’s Statistics, Labor Force 
Survey, has arrived at comparable figures.   12 
Unemployment benefits are constructed from program rules.  Cash benefits were 
uniform across plans, with benefits proportional at 90 percent of earnings up to a fairly low 
maximum, after which benefits remain flat just below 140,000 DK ($25,000): 
    ) 709 , 136 , 9 . 0 min( i i e B = , 
and ei of course denotes pre-unemployment earnings.
 25  Benefits are a function of weekly 
earnings prior to unemployment, so we adjust reported annual earnings for weeks of 
employment to construct weekly earnings and then the benefit rate, which in turn is converted 
to an annual figure.  Since 1994 these benefits have been taxed as have social assistance 
benefits, although we do not adjust for taxes here. 
We can also estimate the social assistance benefits for which the individual would be 
eligible if she were unemployed and  uninsured.  Welfare counselors are given a non-
negligible degree of discretion in the Danish welfare system, so these estimates are not 
exact, but a similar degree of uncertainty is likely to exist in the mind of the decision-maker, 
who is after all speculating on her own social assistance eligibility.  Unlike unemployment 
insurance, social assistance is means-tested.  The system distinguishes in a modest way 
between asset income and other family earnings, and it is therefore necessary to partition Ai 
into these components.  Denote asset income and other family earnings by  i a  and family 
wealth by  i v ,  i i i A n a + = .  The social assistance benefits for which a married worker would 
be eligible when unemployed has the following form: 
Si = max [0,
* * - - i i i v a S ] 
where 
*
i S  is 80% of the maximum unemployment benefit if the family has children, and 60% 
if it does not, and  ) 000 , 10 , 0 max( - =
*
i i v v . 
                                                 
25  Benefits are also bounded by zero, which affects those workers with negative incomes in 1995.   13 
The base fee f is essentially constant, varying only with part-time/full-time work and 
student status (there is a significant student discount).
 26  U-funds are free to offer ancillary 
services, such as job training and counseling, but must pay for them out of fees in excess of 
those for benefits.  We exclude from our sample students and pensioners because of their 
distinctive circumstances, so that the fee varies only with U-fund service-provision and part-
time status, and is potentially correlated with other omitted decision factors.  We view the 
impact of fees on membership as not identifiable in our data, and exclude the fee variable. 
VI  Unemployment Fund Membership in Denmark: Some Aggregate Evidence 
Aggregate data reveal much about the nature of the U-fund system and the sensitivity 
of U -fund membership to economic incentives.  The time trend in U-fund membership is 
graphed in Figure 1 for the 1987-2001 period, along with two measures of the aggregate 
unemployment rate, the official measure and the OECD standardized measure.  The 
standardized measure is everywhere less than the official measure, which includes some 
individuals not looking for work.  Membership in an unemployment fund approached 80 
percent in 1995, a figure that seems exceptionally high in light of the U.S. experience with 
flood insurance and the U.K. experience with unemployment insurance for mortgagors.  The 
U-fund membership decision, however, is not just an institutional constant, increasing by 10 
percentage points between 1987 and 1995, b efore declining modestly between 1995 and 
2001.  This flow and ebb in membership rates correspond broadly with the increase and 
subsequent decline in the aggregate unemployment rate, although the membership increase 
in the first interval is much larger and enduring than the decline that follows for reasons that 
will become clear shortly. 
Cross-sectional statistics from our primary data set also suggest the importance of 
economic considerations in the membership decision.  With fixed premiums across 
individuals, a high risk of unemployment should encourage U-fund membership.  In Figure 2, 
                                                 
26  A student can become a U-fund member, even though ineligible for benefits while a student.  Upon 
leaving full-time student status, the individual can then begin receiving unemployment benefits while 
looking for her first post-school job.   14 
we report age profiles for (i) the worker’s unemployment experience, specifically whether the 
worker was unemployed all of week 48 (Panel A), and (ii) the worker’s U-fund status (Panel 
B).  As one might expect, unemployment rates peak among workers in their early 20s, falling 
more or less continuously through age 50 before climbing again.  Intuitively one might 
conjecture that U-fund membership would follow the same pattern, first declining and then 
increasing with age.  That does not appear to be the case; fund membership is remarkably 
flat throughout the bulk of the individual’s active work life, Figure 2 Panel B.  This surprising 
constancy of U-fund membership across age can only partly be explained by age variations 
in social assistance eligibility; safety net eligibility declines more or less continuously 
throughout the work life as assets accumulate and the incomes of spouses grow.  A major 
complicating factor is efterløn, the early retirement supplement, which for those working in 
1995 required twenty years of service in the 25 years prior to receipt, which can begin as 
early as age 60.  This provides an incentive for all workers over 40 to belong to a fund, and, 
because of the investment aspect of U-fund benefit eligibility, for younger workers who belong 
to a fund to remain members despite falling unemployment risk prior to the efterløn pay-in 
period. 
There is strong evidence of the efterløn effect on membership.  In 1992; the efterløn 
eligibility requirement was raised from ten to twenty years.  If efterløn is an attractive addition 
to U-fund membership, one would predict large effects on the U-fund membership in the age 
40 to 50 bracket in 1992 and that is exactly what  we observe.  In one year U -fund 
membership increased by 10 percentage points for workers in their forties, while remaining 
stable for almost all other age brackets.  The size of this shift can be compared to the 
stability of the age profile of U-fund membership in the years before (Figure 3A) and after 
(Figure 3B).  Danish workers in their 40s appear quite sensitive to the economic returns to 
fund membership. 
In Figure 4, we report income profiles by decile for unemployment rates (Panel A) and 
U-fund membership rates (Panel B).  Unemployment is high in the lower half of the income   15 
distribution, especially in the third through fifth deciles, and is essentially nonexistent in the 
upper deciles.
27  Despite the high unemployment risk, the low U-fund membership rates in 
the bottom half of the distribution are perhaps not surprising, given the access to means-
tested social assistance for this group.  The high membership rates in the higher income 
deciles, at which point unemployment is an extraordinarily uncommon event, remain a 
puzzle.  The figure says much about the redistributional consequences of shifting to a 
compulsory universal system, an issue we return to below. 
VII  U-Fund Membership: A Multivariate Logit Analysis 
The aggregate data suggest that Danish workers, in deciding whether to insure 
themselves against unemployment losses, are sensitive to the expected economic factors, 
including unemployment levels, access to social assistance, and the presence of tie-in 
programs such as efterløn.  In this section we report on a multivariate analysis of individual 
data to provide more precise estimates of these effects.  In Table 1A, we define the variables 
used in the analysis, in Table 1B we report on their means and standard deviations. 
A potentially important complication is that individual unemployment experiences may 
not be independent of U-fund membership.  The usual moral hazard concerns arise—insured 
workers are more likely to “choose” unemployment if laid off.  That concern requires that we 
undertake a two stage process: in the first step we estimate the worker’s probability of being 
unemployed, using that model to estimate the expected unemployment risk, which is then 
embedded in the second step estimation of the membership decision.  The unemployment 
risk measure used as a regressor in the second stage is an imputed variable and thus 
measured with sampling error (the unemployment risk estimates are reported in full in an 
Appendix available from the authors).  We use a procedure proposed by Murphy and Topel 
(1985) to correct all standard errors in the second stage.  The procedure is quite general and 
                                                 
27  In the first two deciles, both unemployment and membership rates are low, no doubt reflecting the 
limited connections to the labor force of part-time and casual workers.   16 
has the standard instrumental variable method as a special case (see Murphy and Topel, 
1985). 
Recall the formal decision model of Section IV.  Approximating the expected utility 
differential  D by the linear index  I and further assuming that the decision to join the 
unemployment insurance plan is subject to a decision error e with mean zero, the decision to 
join the fund can be represented as: 
Join an unemployment fund iff:  
  0 ‡ -e I , or  e ‡ I . 
The probability of joining the unemployment insurance pool is then: 
P (UF=1) = G(I), 
where G is assumed to be the cumulative logistic function.  This is a standard logit model, 
with the indicator function I of the form: 
    X A e S B f I 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ˆ a a a a a a q a a + + + + + + + = , 
where the X vector denotes various controls.  The X vector presumably includes observables 
correlated with risk aversion and other unobserved decision factors such as age, marital 
status, number of children in the family, educational level, asset income, and spouse’s 
earnings. 
The unemployment membership fund decision was then estimated using logit 
techniques and the results are reported in Table 2.  In Columns (1) and (2) we present the 
coefficients and standard errors respectively of a U-fund membership model for 1995 with 
industry and occupation excluded.
28  We are especially interested in three variables--the 
unemployment risk measure and the two key "price" variables, potential unemployment 
benefits and potential social assistance benefits (if unemployed and not a U-fund member).  
All three coefficients are of the expected sign and highly significant,
 with unemployment risk 
                                                 
28  In this model, industry  and occupation come into the model solely through their effects on the 
individual’s expected unemployment experience, providing additional identifying restrictions in the 
estimation.   17 
and the unemployment benefit level increasing the U -fund membership probability and the 
potential social assistance benefit reducing it as theory predicts. 
The unemployment risk coefficient roughly implies a 0.36 percentage point increase in 
U-fund membership for each addition percentage point of unemployment risk.
29  Because a 
much larger share of workers belong to U-funds than are unemployed, this translates into a 
relatively low elasticity, about 0.04 at the point of means.  Similar computations at the point of 
means for the benefits elasticities suggest (i) a U-fund benefit elasticity of 0.54, and (ii) a 
social assistance benefit elasticity of -0.03.  The large difference in absolute magnitudes of 
the two benefit effects—the coefficient on U-fund benefits is 0.280, that on social assistance 
is -0.045—is not predicted by the theory, which would suggest that the differential between 
the two should drive behavior, that is, that the two effects should be equal in absolute 
magnitude, but of opposite sign.  Perhaps stigma exists toward social assistance receipt, 
even in the welfare state.  Alternatively it may be that benefits, perhaps social assistance 
benefits, are poorly measured.
 30  In any case the broad conclusion is that the workers in our 
sample seem sensibly strategic in their U-fund membership behavior. 
We also obtain estimates for  a wide range of controls, many of which can be 
interpreted as adjustments for unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences.  Controlling for 
the incentives to join a fund, those with higher gross income are less likely to join, suggesting 
reduced risk aversion with income; at the point of means, the income elasticity of 
membership is –0.09.  Wealth also reduces membership ceteris paribus, although the wealth 
effect appears to be relatively small.  Controlling for other factors, females, married workers, 
and those with children join funds disproportionately, which is broadly consistent with risk 
aversion expectations.  Despite their low membership rate, the very young (18-25) apply for 
membership beyond expectations, while the old (61-66) are disproportionately less likely to 
                                                 
29  The linear approximation to the logit model can be obtained by multiplying the logit coefficient by 
P*(1-P), where P denotes the probability of being a fund member, or in this case 0.834*0.166=0.138.   18 
be members.  Surprisingly, there appears to be little efterløn effect in the age splines; the 
independent effect of age varies little over the middle years.  Ceteris paribus, the highly 
educated are only marginally more likely to join than those at the lowest level of education 
attainment, with those with only 12 years and no further vocational education or schooling 
being least likely to be members, and those with 12 years of schooling and vocational training 
being substantially more likely to be members. 
To explore the sensitivity of model estimates to our identifying restrictions for the 
unemployment risk instrument, we estimate a second model with the industry and 
occupation dummies appearing directly in the U -fund logit as well as in the unemployment 
probability instrument (as before).  These industry and occupation dummies could, for 
example, capture union social pressures to join the U-fund, an issue we will return to below.  
The results are reported in Table 2, Columns 3 and 4. 
The estimated unemployment risk coefficient increases in magnitude in this model by 
about 30 percent; the linear approximation at the mean membership probability suggests an 
increase in unemployment fund membership of 0.53 percentage points for each one percent 
increase in unemployment expectation, with a corresponding increase in the elasticity 
estimate.  The two benefit coefficients are essentially unchanged with the addition of the 
industry and occupation covariates directly in the U -fund model.  A worker in the base 
industry, agriculture, apparently has the lowest intrinsic likelihood of joining a U -fund 
controlling for measurable economic incentives, with catering and the low-service sector not 
far behind.  Ceteris paribus fund membership is highest in manufacturing, perhaps reflecting 
the origins of U -funds and unions, although less “traditional” union sectors, i.e. the high-
service sector, also has an unusually high propensity to join a U-fund. 
We also estimated the primary models on a variety of subsamples.  These estimates, 
available on request from the authors, suggest that the basic structure of the results is robust 
                                                                                                                                                        
30  Benefits are constructed as the annual benefits for which a worker would be eligible if she were 
without earnings for the e ntire year.  S is computed according to guidelines, but there is considerable   19 
to partitioning by gender and by broad industry and occupational groupings.  Age partitions 
had a more substantial quantitative, but not qualitative, effect on the estimates.  We 
partitioned the sample by age and reran the model separately on the age groups 18-34, 35-
49, and 50-66. Tables 3.  The qualitative structure of the findings remains robust for the three 
age groupings.  All the key variables have strongly significant coefficients of the expected 
sign.  Unemployment risk and the generosity of U-fund and social assistance influence the U-
fund decision in strong and predictable ways that are stable across age.  Two exceptions are 
education level and the presence of children in the household, which affect the insurance 
decision very differently for young workers and old.  For young workers, high education levels 
are correlated with recent entry into the labor market; for older workers, this consideration is 
no longer relevant.  Concerning children, older people are less likely to be financial 
responsible for their children and it is not obvious what signs to expect on the children 
dummies a priori.    The magnitudes of the key price coefficients, however, do vary across 
age brackets, with the membership decisions of the young and the old especially sensitive to 
unemployment risk, and of the young to social assistance, for which they are more likely to 
be eligible. 
VIII.  The U-fund Membership Decision: Conditional Logit Estimates 
It is unlikely that we have included all the factors that systematically determine either 
unemployment risk or U -fund membership, which raises concerns about unobserved 
heterogeneity in both the unemployment instrument and the U-fund model.  In particular, the 
worker’s attitudes towards risk and taste for work are only crudely proxied in our study.  
Moreover, the degree of risk aversion might influence not just the insurance decision, but also 
the unemployment risk measure, b ecause risk averse individuals might partially “insure” 
themselves by their choices of education and occupation.  Thus, we want to factor out 
individual specific fixed effects in both steps, the unemployment risk and the insurance 
decision estimations.  Fortunately we could obtained data for 1993, so that we can estimate a 
                                                                                                                                                        
discretion in actual payments.   20 
“fixed effects” model of U -fund membership (the 1995 model uses 1994 and 1995 data, so 
the 1994 model requires 1993 and 1994 data).   
Chamberlain’s conditional logit model is a natural estimating structure, Chamberlain 
(1980,1984).
31  The model requires that the sample be limited to status changers only.  The 
dependent variable in the conditional logit is a dummy equal to one if the individual moved 
from non-membership to membership in a U-fund between November of 1994 and November 
of 1995 and zero if she moved from membership to non-membership.  The probability that an 
individual makes a transition from membership to non-membership or the reverse is driven 
by  changes in the values of the covariates, so fixed effects (and any time-invariant 
covariates) are eliminated from the analysis, permitting unbiased estimation of the remaining 
variables.  
Limiting the sample to U-fund changers dramatically reduces the size of our sample.  
The limited number of insurance status changers arises no doubt in part because of the 
investment aspect of U -fund membership, that one must belong to a U -fund for one year 
before becoming eligible for benefits upon entering unemployment.  This investment 
consideration has the effect of limiting U-fund exits, though not entries, and we would expect 
only a small number of exits from U -fund status in any year.  The sample size problem is 
made more severe when combined with the evidence that model parameters vary by age.  
Because of these considerations we limit our conditional analysis to the young, estimating 
the conditional logit on a sample of workers between the ages of 18 and 34, a group 
dominated by entry into U -funds.  This age group, although only 38 percent of our  total 
sample, includes 73% of all U -fund status changers.  This age group is also likely to be 
unaffected by efterløn. 
The logic of the fixed effects analysis of U -fund decisions applies as well to the 
worker’s unemployment experience—the parameter estimates may be affected by 
unobservables in that relationship, ones that are perhaps more or less constant from one   21 
year to the next for a given individual (like risk aversion, presumably).  As a result we 
undertook a conditional logit analysis of the probability of being unemployment in the 48
th 
week, and use that model to construct the estimated change in unemployment risk 
necessary for the estimation of the conditional U-fund logit.  The details of the unemployment 
estimation and the parameter estimates of the resulting model are reported in an appendix 
available from the authors. 
We report in Table 4 the estimates of a conditional U-fund logit model, which relies 
entirely on changes in the covariates between 1994 and 1995.  For purposes of comparison 
we also include the levels logit estimates of U -fund membership in 1995 for the same age 
group, Columns (1) and (2).  If fixed effects have not biased the level estimates, the 
conditional logit estimates should parallel the level parameter estimates, although it i s 
important to note that there is likely to be substantial sampling variation.  The levels model is 
based on 84,318 observations, the conditional logit on only 5,463.  The pattern of signs in the 
conditional logit, Columns (3) and (4) replicates those in the level regressions, although the 
conditional logit estimates would suggest that unobserved fixed effects seriously bias 
downwards the positive effects of high levels of education on U-fund membership ceteris 
paribus. 
Of special interest to us, the three incentive variable coefficients in the conditional logit 
replicate the sign pattern of the level regression.  Greater unemployment risk significantly 
increases the likelihood of U-fund membership as do more generous unemployment benefits, 
while more generous social assistance benefits reduce the likelihood.  The absolute 
magnitudes of the effects are sharply lower than the level estimates, however--by 67 percent, 
56 percent, and 45 percent for unemployment risk, unemployment benefits, and social 
assistance benefits respectively.  We are unsure which set of estimates is superior; the 
conditional estimates are theoretically preferred if “fixed’ effects are the only problem with 
model specification, but these estimates are not as robust as the level estimates based on 
                                                                                                                                                        
31   Bjorklund (1985) provides an early application to unemployment models.   22 
more than 10 time as many observations.  Tests suggest that both models produce 
consistent estimators.
32  Qualitatively both models signal that workers are sensitive to 
economic incentives in deciding to join a U-fund.   
IX.  The Political Economy of Voluntary UI in Denmark: 
The Revenue Gains from Compulsion 
Union-based, voluntary U-funds lost much of their logic with the transition to a national 
system of finance that involved no implicit risk rating of premiums by craft or industry.  A 
premium unrelated to unemployment risk is unlikely to induce rational selection across 
workers.  Finland and Sweden have programs that are more voluntary in form than spirit, 
each with subsidy rates of about 95%.  Indeed the Swedes briefly converted to a compulsory 
system in the early 1990s, although canceling that decision within a year.  What could explain 
the political stability of a voluntary system in Denmark?  Our 10 percent Danish sample 
permits us to estimate the net revenue gains that would result from instituting a universal, 
compulsory insurance system on Danish workers, while identifying the expected individual 
gainers and losers from such a transition.  In the process we uncover one important reason 
why the voluntary program remains politically popular. 
We assume no behavioral responses to the voluntary/compulsory regime change.  
The most obvious concern would be the withdrawal of workers from the labor force if 
compelled to consume earnings insurance that they do not value at cost.  This is likely to be 
a special problem among low-wage workers who did not take up U -fund membership 
because of the presence of a preferred social assistance alternative.  Although high-wage 
                                                 
32  Using a Hauseman (1978) test of the conditional model against the corresponding unconditional 
model (i.e., the levels model pooled over 1994 and 1995) we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity (no unobserved heterogeneity): Let ML indicate maximum likelihood and CML conditional 
ML, Var is the estimated covariance matrix computed for the maximum likelihood estimator ß. The test 
is then based on the chi-squared statistics (ßCML - ß ML)’(Var[CML] – Var[ML])
-1(ßCML - ß ML), which needs 
to be large to cast doubt on the hypothesis of homogeneity (the degree of freedom is e qual to the 
number of regressors), and we get a negative number (interpreted as zero).  Under the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity, the conditional estimator is still consistent, it is just not efficient. So our test indicates 
that both the unconditional and the conditional estimators are consistent.  Had we rejected the null 
hypothesis for the alternative, that would have suggested that only the conditional estimators are 
consistent (and efficient, then); the unconditional estimators would have been inconsistent.   23 
workers compelled to join a U-fund would suffer utility losses from the regime change, the 
utility effect would likely be small and the impact on labor force participation slight. 
The calculation of the revenue gain from universal compulsion is a simple one: for 
each individual in our sample who is not currently (1995) a U-fund member, we subtract the 
expected annual benefit payouts from the fee the individual is required to pay, and then sum 
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where 
* R  denotes the aggregate U-fund revenue gain from universal compulsion, and N the 
number of nonparticipants in the voluntary U -fund.  Intuition would suggest that 
*
i R  is a 
positive number for all nonparticipants in the unemployment fund; that is that fees should 
exceed expected payouts, but this need not be the case if nonmembers are myopic, or if they 
are economically rational but currently rely on social assistance that is more generous than 
net unemployment benefits. 
  The revenue gain calculations under compulsion are reported in Column 1 of Table 5, 
Panel A for the total sample and for various demographic subgroups, adjusted upward by a 
factor of ten to account for the fact that we are using a ten percent sample.  The net gains to 
the U-fund system are in fact negative; the U-funds would pay out more in benefits than they 
collected in fees.  The net revenue loss in 1995 is about 600 million DKK ($107 million) out of 
a total expenditure of about 25 billion DKK ($4.46 billion), or about 2.4 percent of the budget. 
  The education breakdowns and perhaps more clearly the income decile breakdowns 
in Table 5, Panel B, Column 1 point to the social assistance system as the primary reason 
for the adverse financial consequences of making the system compulsory.  Many workers 
who would find the U -fund financially attractive in expectation do not join, presumably 
because of the charity hazard.  Forcing all workers with a primary education into the U-fund 
system would impose a net drain on the U-funds of approximately one half a billion Danish 
crowns!  Forcing all workers with some tertiary (post-secondary) education into the system   24 
would yield positive revenue, but only about 150 million Danish crowns ($27 million).  If it was 
possible to limit compulsion to the top four deciles of the income distribution, the gains would 
be only 200 million DKK ($36 million), less than one percent of program expenditures. 
In considering the transition from a voluntary to compulsory system, it is important to 
distinguish the gains (or losses) to the U -funds and to the social assistance program, 
because, u nder current Danish administrative rules, eligibility for unemployment insurance 
preempts eligibility for social assistance, at least as a matter of right.  Under this rule, net 
revenue gains from compulsion in an integrated approach may be very large indeed, as a 
modest UI benefit may preempt a more substantial SA benefit.  That is not a problem in the 
current voluntary system because rational workers will not join U -funds if they expect to 
receive greater benefits under social assistance, but in a compulsory system perverse cases 
are likely to multiply. 
The combined (U-fund plus social assistance) revenue gain from the transition to a 
universal, compulsory system can be computed as: 
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1
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where again Si denotes the social assistance payment for which the i
th uncovered worker is 
eligible if he or she became unemployed.  The results of this computation, in aggregate and 
by demographic group are reported in Table 5, Panel A, Column 2, and by income decile in 
Panel B.  A shift to compulsory U-fund membership would result in government savings to 
the combined U -fund and social assistance programs of 2.5 billion Danish crowns ($446 
million), approximately 10 percent of U-fund expenditures in 1995.  
  Any program change whose primary financial gain comes from social assistance 
savings is likely to have troubling distributional effects and this is clear from the demographic 
breakdowns in Table 5.  About 60 percent of the projected cost saving comes from primary 
education workers, Table 5, Panel A, Column 2.  More than eighty percent of the program 
revenue gain from compulsion would be extracted from the lowest 30 percent of the gross 
income distribution, Table 5, Panel B.   25 
To the extent that the shift from a voluntary to a compulsory system is largely at the 
expense of low-wage workers, these projected revenue gains are perhaps illusory.  A 
potentially more meaningful calculation is the revenue gain to compulsion that arise when the 
economic well-being of social assistance beneficiaries is protected.  Assume for example 
that unemployment fund benefits cannot be less than the social assistance benefits for which 
the unemployed worker is currently (1995) eligible plus the membership fee.  Denote by 
* * * R  
the aggregate revenue gain when the economic well-being of current social assistance 
eligibles is “protected,” so that: 
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With this benefit protection, the total government saving in the two programs is about one 
quarter of the combined saving without that protection, or 576 million DKK ($103 million), 
about 2.3 percent of total U-fund expenditures in 1995, Table 5, Panel A, Column 3.  Almost 
all these savings are generated from social assistance eligibles who do not become 
unemployed, yet now must pay the U -fund membership fee.  The distributional 
consequences are self-evident.  Even with the social assistance benefit protection, almost 40 
percent of the revenue gain comes from workers with basic education, Table 5, Panel A, 
Column 3, and 35 percent from the lowest three deciles of the earnings distribution, Panel B.  
The unfavorable redistributional aspect may explain why Sweden's experiment in the early 
1990s with compulsion was reversed after only a year.  
X.  Conclusion 
The Danish unemployment insurance system, having grown out of trade union 
programs, is voluntary, although heavily subsidized.  This permits us to assess empirically 
unemployment insurance demand functions.  Viewed from the perspective of the small take-
up rates of federal flood insurance in the United States and of private unemployment 
mortgage insurance in the United Kingdom, the 80 percent take-up rate of public 
unemployment insurance in Denmark is extraordinary.  The reasons for this high take-up rate   26 
are less clear.  The substantial public subsidy can only be part of the answer, flood insurance 
in the U.S. has also been highly subsidized.  Three obvious possibilities come to mind: (i) 
extreme risk aversion among those in secure jobs, (ii) the tied-in early retirement scheme 
(efterløn), and/or (iii) worker solidarity.  Perhaps participation rate studies for other types of 
insurance with less obvious social implications may provide an answer to the motivational 
question. 
The potential gain of voluntary programs is from targeting; workers who value this 
insurance at cost reveal themselves.  Selection gain, however, requires that the selection 
improve efficiency, a requirement that need not hold if (i) workers are myopic; (ii) system 
prices do not reflect “market” values, and/or (iii) free-riding on other social programs is 
attractive.  The last two problems are surely serious, with U-fund fees the same for all full-
time workers in the economy and social assistance generous.  The fixed unemployment fund 
fee and fixed benefits for most workers lead to the hypothesis that fund membership should 
be sensitive to unemployment expectations, an hypothesis that the data strongly confirm.  
For those workers below the benefit ceiling, there is a second hypothesis, that those with 
high replacement rates should join unemployment funds.  This hypothesis is also confirmed 
when we control for a countervailing force among low-wage workers, the impact of the social 
assistance program; the charity hazard is high in the Danish unemployment insurance 
system. 
The substantial adverse selection in the participation decision would seem to argue 
for either a compulsory public system or better risk rating of individual workers.  What then 
can explain the long-term political support in Denmark for a voluntary system?  The answer 
seems to lay with the identification of the gainers and losers from converting to a universal, 
compulsory system.  The projected revenue gains from a transition to a compulsory system 
are modest but not inconsequential.  We estimate that the net gain to the unemployment 
funds (fees collected less expected benefit disbursements) would be on the order of 2.5 
billion DKK ($446 million) if the implicit savings from the preempted social assistance   27 
payments are included as revenue gains.  More interesting is the identity of the losers.  A 
significant share of the increased revenue, about one half, would come from low skilled 
workers.  If we assume that unemployment benefits would be adjusted upward so that social 
assistance eligibles are made no worse off by the transition to a compulsory system, the 
redistribution is less stark, but the net revenue gains shrink by 60 percent.  Any revenue gain 
from such a transition is disproportionately derived from the unskilled.  It may not be 
accidental that voluntary systems remain in place in welfare states with high universal safety 
nets. 
The apparent economic illogic of the Danish voluntary public system does not 
discount the potential value of public voluntary systems in other contexts, especially in less 
developed economies.  What is required are (i) reasonable coverage of the industrial work 
force by craft-linked trade unions or labor organizations, (ii) limited public pooling of risk 
across funds, and (iii) the absence of generous means-tested social programs for workers 
who do not join a fund.  These conditions were apparently common at the turn of the last 
century in Europe, and could well exist in developing countries today.  A voluntary system 
with reasonable individual risk-rating may be optimal more generally.   28 
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U  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker was unemployed all of 
week 48 (4
th week of November). 
U-fund  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker was a member of an 
unemployment fund. 
qˆ   The probability a worker is unemployed all of week 48, derived from the 
unemployment logit reported in the data appendix to this paper. 
B  The projected annual unemployment fund benefits the worker would qualify 
for if unemployed for one year (in 10,000 DKK). 
S  The projected annual social assistance benefits the worker would qualify 
for if unemployed and without unemployment benefits for the calendar year 
(in 10,000 DKK). 
FEMALE  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker is female. 
AGE18-25 SP  Age in years for those 18 to 25, 25 for all others. 
AGE26-30 SP  Zero if age  less than 26, one to five for those age 26 to 30, five for all 
others. 
AGE31-35 SP  Zero if age less than 31, one to five for those age 31 to 35, five for all 
others. 
AGE36-40 SP  Zero if age less than 36, one to five for those age 36 to 40, five for all 
others. 
AGE41-50 SP  Zero if age less than 41, one to ten for those age 41 to 50, five for all 
others. 
AGE51-60 SP  Zero if age less than 51, one to ten for those age 51 to 60, five for all 
others. 
AGE61-66 SP  Zero if age less than 61, one to six for those age 61 to 66. 
ED1  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was 7. 
ED2  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was 9 or primary education. 
ED3  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was 10 or 11 with very short vocational training. 
ED4  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was "gymnasium," (12 years). 
ED5  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was "skilled by vocational training." 
ED6  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was short term tertiary education. 
ED7  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was medium-term tertiary education. 
ED8  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's highest grade 
completed was long-term tertiary education.   31 
UNSK  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is 
unskilled worker in week 48. 
SKLD  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is skilled 
worker in week 48. 
CLER  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is clerical. 
MNGR  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is 
manager in week 48. 
DIR  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is director. 
SE  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is self-
employed in week 48. 
LEAVE  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is "on 
leave in week 48." 
STUD  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is student. 
PEN  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is "on 
pension in week 48." 
OLF  A zero-one dummy, with one indication the worker's occupation is "on 
pension" or out of the labor force in week 48. 
AGRIC  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is agriculture in week 48. 
MANUF  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is manufacturing in week 48. 
CONST  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is construction in week 48. 
WHOLE  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is wholesale in week 48. 
RETAIL  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the w orker's industry of 
employment is retail in week 48. 
CATERING  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is catering in week 48. 
TRANS  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is transport in week 48. 
FINANCE  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is finance in week 48. 
SERV-LOW  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is low skilled service in week 48. 
SERV-HG  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is high skilled service in week 48. 
PUBLIC  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker's industry of 
employment is public sector in week 48. 
U-YR  The fraction of the year unemployed. 
UF/SA  A zero-one dummy, with one indicting receipt of either unemployment 
benefits or social assistance or both in the calendar year. 
GROSSINC  Gross annual income (in 10,000 DKK)   32 
WEALTH  Physical asset wealth (in 10,000 DKK). 
MARRIED  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker is married. 
CHILD0  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker has no children living in 
the household. 
CHILD1-3  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker has one to three 
children living in the household. 
CHILD4+  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker has four or more 
children living in the household. 
PART-TIME  A zero-one dummy, with one indicating the worker worked less than 30 
hours at his job or was insured part-time and unemployed in the survey 
week.   33 
Panel B 
 
Summary Statistics For Unemployment And U-fund Logits, 1995 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.    Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
U  0.092  0.289    MANUF 94  0.186597  0.389588 
U-fund  0.834  0.372    WHOLE 94  0.055134  0.228242 
qˆ   0.092  0.178    CONST 94  0.053994  0.226007 
FEMALE  0.454703  0.497945    RETAIL 94  0.04727  0.212217 
AGE18-25 SP  24.56723  1.346462    CATERING 94  0.016314  0.126679 
AGE26-30 SP  4.048787  1.826346    TRANS 94  0.061427  0.240113 
AGE31-35 SP  3.356326  2.228995    FINANCE 94  0.030693  0.172485 
AGE36-40 SP  2.698218  2.386    SERV-LOW 94  0.056128  0.23017 
AGE41-50 SP  3.451506  4.273387    SERV-HIGH 94  0.035701  0.185544 
AGE51-60 SP  1.068683  2.572314    PUBLIC 94  0.300824  0.458617 
AGE61-66 SP  0.069959  0.5083    U-YR 94  0.099895  0.236988 
ED2  0.097269  0.296324    U 94  0.078939  0.269645 
ED3  0.110177  0.313111    UF/SA 94  0.348217  0.476406 
ED4  0.039438  0.194635    B  11.68272  3.464545 
ED5  0.412877  0.492352    S  3.581108  4.278343 
ED6  0.067725  0.251273    GROSSINC 94  19.71557  14.09665 
ED7  0.095662  0.294127    WEALTH 94  8.520886  102.1688 
ED8  0.05112  0.220244    GROSSINC  20.89638  14.08703 
SKLD 94  0.122945  0.328375    WEALTH  9.272337  105.0801 
CLER 94  0.231801  0.421984    MARRIED  0.523167  0.499464 
MNGR 94  0.239783  0.426952    CHILD1-3  0.386778  0.487013 
DIR 94  0.005839  0.07619    CHILD4+  0.006706  0.081616 
SE 94  0.008127  0.089785    PART-TIME  0.0723104  0.2590017 
LEAVE 94  0.020732  0.142484     
STUD 94  0.007033  0.083568     
PEN 94  0.001594  0.039889     
OLF 94  0.020495  0.141688     
Number of Observations  220,245
Source: Danish Statistics.  Note: All variables refer to 1995 unless otherwise noted.   34 
Table 2 
 
Logit Estimates of Unemployment Fund Membership 1995 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
     
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
qˆ  2.594243***  0.06429  3.845259***  0.074934 
B  0.279975***  0.00359  0.312545***  0.003972 
S  -0.04522***  0.00187  -0.0439***  0.001942 
GROSSINC  -0.02659***  0.000611  -0.02802***  0.000647 
WEALTH  -0.00037***  0.000089  -0.00039***  9.33E-05 
FEMALE  0.66949***  .01574015  0.781186***  0.017024 
CHILD0         
CHILD1-3  0.14878***  .01848531  0.116941***  0.019047 
CHILD4+  -0.16831**  .07849333  -0.19418**  0.082455 
MARRIED  0.240546***  .01887382  0.250253***  0.019465 
Age18-25 SP  0.321181***  .00732899  0.305019***  0.007814 
Age26-30 SP  0.013901*  .00794063  0.01615**  0.008318 
Age31-35 SP  -0.02408***  .00782443  -0.02281***  0.008108 
Age36-40 SP  0.013167*  .00716846  0.020675***  0.007382 
Age41-50 SP  0.032111***  .0035263  0.032414***  0.003612 
Age51-60 SP  -0.06321***  .00394188  -0.06585***  0.004033 
Age61-66 SP  -0.23621***  .01249516  -0.22382***  0.012816 
ED1         
ED2  -0.14077***  .03015247  -0.19264***  0.031626 
ED3  -0.2332***  .0292469  -0.2876***  0.030713 
ED4  -0.72793***  .03567602  -0.66069***  0.037895 
ED5  0.51691***  .02430515  0.377743***  0.026282 
ED6  -0.08978***  .03337736  -0.10964***  0.036347 
ED7  -0.29054***  .0294539  -0.19999***  0.034042 
ED8  -0.19239***  .03478706  -0.04136***  0.038965 
UNSKLD 94       
SKLD 94    0.528514***  0.029622 
CLERICAL 94      0.239094***  0.021923 
MANAGER 94      0.069257***  0.024987 
DIRECTOR 94      -0.11098  0.07964 
SE94      -0.42055***  0.070608 
LEAVE94      2.072799***  0.087222 
AGRIC 94         
MANUF 94      1.305716***  0.030955 
CONST 94      0.86827***  0.040939 
WHOLE 94      0.721987***  0.038887 
RETAIL 94      0.614465***  0.039176 
CATERING 94      0.097785**  0.055549 
TRANS 94      0.407894***  0.035225 
FINANCE 94      0.387412***  0.046474 
SERV-L 94      0.528653***  0.0368 
SERV-H 94      0.723818***  0.043745 
PUBLIC 94      0.4211***  0.027231 
PART-TIME  -1.04454***  .02837495  -0.73833***  0.030243 
CONSTANT  -9.22885***  .16275027  -10.0482***  0.174938   35 
     
Log likelihood  -74798  -72623 
LR c
2  48540  52892 
P-value of c
2  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo-R
2  0.2450  0.2669 
Source: Danish Statistics.  The dependent variable is UF95.  The sample size is 220,245.  The 
base group is single males with no children, only basic education, and (for model (2)) working in 
agriculture as an unskilled laborer.  A coefficient is significant at level 0.01 when marked by ***, 
at level 0.05 when marked by **, and at level 0.10 when marked by *.  The standard errors are 
Murphy-Topel corrected.   36 
Table 3 
 




  18-34  35-49  50-65 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  Coefficient  Std.Error  Coefficient  Std.Error 
       
qˆ   2.612***  0.110  1.263***  0.115  4.922***  0.174 
B  0.296***  0.0062  0.229***  0.0065  0.351***  0.0098 
S  -0.060***  0.0029  -0.037***  0.0030  -0.020***  0.0056 
GROSSINC  -0.037***  0.0017  -0.028***  0.0009  -0.018***  0.0014 
WEALTH  -0.001**  0.0004  -0.000  0.0001  -0.0004***  0.0001 
FEMALE  0.512***  0.0247  0.704***  0.0266  0.554***  0.0493 
CHILD0             
CHILD1-3  0.274***  0.033  0.087***  0.026  -0.195***  0.050 
CHILD4+  -0.151  0.155  -0127  0.092  -0.595  0.569 
MARRIED  0.461***  0.036  0.278***  0.029  0.089*  0.049 
Age18-25 SP  0.296***  0.008         
Age26-30 SP  -0.014  0.009         
Age31-35 SP  -0.015  0.012         
Age36-40 SP      0.022***  0.008     
Age41-50 SP      0.026***  0.005     
Age51-60 SP          -0.093***  0.005 
Age61-66 SP          -0.226***  0.013 
ED1             
ED2  0.366***  0.065  0.163***  0.051  -0.033  0.081 
ED3  0.351***  0.065  0.048  0.049  -0.596***  0.074 
ED4  -0.089  0.070  -0.452***  0.063  -0.762***  0.111 
ED5  1.230***  0.064  0.516***  0.038  0.296***  0.040 
ED6  0.943***  0.081  -0.191***  0.048  -0.309***  0.065 
ED7  1.033***  0.079  -0.286***  0.044  -0.787***  0.048 
ED8  1.060***  0.085  -0.074  0.052  -0.920***  0.065 
PART-TIME  -1.856***  0.056  -1.150***  0.049  -0.237***  0.063 
CONSTANT  -9.156***   0.185  -0.649***  0.102  -1.694***  0.141 
       
Sample Size  84,318  86,738  49,189 
Log likelihood  -29,621  -27,709  -16,347 
LR c
2  30,116  7,904  9,410 
P-value of c
2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo-R
2  0.337  0.125  0.223 
Source: Danish Statistics.  The dependent variable is UF95.  The sample size is 220,245.  The base 
group is single males with no children, only basic education.  A coefficient is significant at level 0.01 
when marked by ***, at level 0.05 when marked by **, and at level 0.10 when marked by *.  The standard 
errors are Murphy-Topel corrected.   37 
Table 4 
 
Level and Conditional Logit Estimates Of Unemployment Fund Membership 
Workers Age 18 to 34, 1994 and 1995 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 




Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error.  Coefficient  Std.Error 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
qˆ   2.612***  0.110  0.792***  0.195 
B   0.296***  0.0062  0.125***  0.016 
S  -0.060***  0.0029  -0.032**  0.013 
GROSSINC  -0.037***  0.0017  0.0212**  0.009 
WEALTH  -0.001**  0.0004  0.0013  0.004 
FEMALE  0.512***  0.0247     
CHILD1-3  0.274***  0.033  0.339*  0.179 
CHILD4+  -0.151  0.155  -1.056  1.537 
MARRIED  0.461***  0.036  0.145  0.223 
AGE18-25 SP  0.296***  0.008  0.373*  0.198 
AGE26-30 SP  -0.014  0.009  -0.031  0.193 
AGE31-35 SP  -0.015  0.012  0.0158  0.206 
ED2  0.366***  0.065  -0.211  0.909 
ED3  0.351***  0.065  -0.572  0.8261 
ED4  -0.089  0.070  -1.051  0.843 
ED5  1.230***  0.064  2.753***  0.823 
ED6  0.943***  0.081  2.491**  1.002 
ED7  1.033***  0.079  3.361***  1.220 
ED8  1.060***  0.085  4.674***  1.362652 
PART-TIME  -1.856***  0.056  -2.284***  0.164 
     
Sample Size  84,318  5463 
Log likelihood  -29,605  -1869 
LR c
2  30148   
P-value of c
2  0.0000   
Pseudo-R
2  0.337   
Data Source: Danish Statistics.  The dependent variable is UF in Model 1 and dUF in Model 2, 
where dUF is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker entered a U-fund and a zero if she 
exited a U-fund.  All independent variables in Model 2 are first differences.  For the construction 
of ??, the change in unemployment risk, see the Appendix.  A coefficient is significant at level 
0.01 when marked by ***; at level 0.05 when marked by **; and at level 0.10 when marked by *.  




Potential Revenue Gains Of Compulsory U-Fund Membership: 
Denmark 1995 (In Mill. DKK) 
 


















    (1)  (2)  (3) 
         
TOTAL  43,905  - 598  2542  576 
         
MALE  22,717  - 303  1452  410 
FEMALE   21,188  - 296  1090  167 
         
PRIMARY ED  21,392  - 551  1463  246 
SECONDARY  11,646  - 144  406  113 
SHORT TERT.  2,622   29  68  50 
MEDIUM TERT.  4,456   81  122  102 
LONG TERT.  2,959   45  81  62 
 
Panel B 
Potential Revenue Gains Of Compulsory UI 
By Population Gross Income Deciles 

























           
      (1)  (2)  (3) 
  1   117,352  16054  - 362  1910  202 
  2  145,105  5437  - 216  196  13 
  3  167,960  3447  - 113  47  7 
  4  188,147  2358  -57  24  12 
  5  206,461  1927  -30  26  18 
  6  225,410  1782  -10  25  22 
  7  248,290  1980  6  38  35 
  8  279,412  3877  37  66  64 
  9  341,592  3213  52  80  78 
 10   7,053,389  4830  95  128  126 
 
Note: (5.6 DKK= $1 US in 1995)  The raw numbers in the 10% sample are reported in the 
second column, while the cost estimates have been expanded by a factor of ten to reflect 
population values.  The alternative models are defined more completely in the text.   39 
Figure 1 
 
Unemployment Fund Membership and Official and Standardized Unemployment Rates, Denmark 1987-2001
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